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EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS, 
VOTING RIGHTS, AND PLANT CLOSINGS* 
Congress has enacted many statutes which provide tax incentives for 
the transfer of a corporate employer's stock to its employees. 1, One of 
these, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 2 
provides for the creation of special employee benefit arrangements called 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). 3 Several hundred corpora-
tions have already set up ESOPs for their employees. 4 
After examining the structure and tax consequences of ESOPs, this 
note will argue that ESOPs should guarantee employees full voting rights5 
over securities transferred to them under such plans. This note will also 
propose that ESOPs can be used in employee takeovers of corporations 
as part of a plan to help prevent plant closings. 
*The author is deeply indebted to Mr. Michael A. Conte, a graduate student in economics 
at the University of Michigan, for his help in preparing this manuscript. 
I Five acts have included special provisions for employee stock ownership plans of 
various types. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at 19 
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (Supp. 1975)) (19 U.S.C. § 2373 (f)(I) (Supp. 1975) authorized the 
Secretary of Commerce to give a -preference to corporations which establish qualified 
employee stock ownership plans.); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 
1520 (codified in scattered sections in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and 29 U.S.C. 
(Supp. 1977)) (Section 802 of the Act extends the investment tax.credit for certain corpora-
tions' employee stock ownership plans which is authorized in I.R.C. § 46(a)(I).); Tax 
Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified in the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 (Supp. 1976).) (i.R'.C. §§ 46(a)(I) codifies the investment tax credit for corporations 
which adopt certain employee stock ownership plans.); Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and 29 U .S.C. (Supp. 1976)) (Employee stock ownership 
plans are defined in I.R.C. § 4975(e)(8).); and Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. 
L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985, (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (Supp. 1976)). (Employee 
stock ownership plans are defined at 45 U .S.C. § 702 (Supp. 1976).). 
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and 29 U .S.C. (Supp. 
1976)) [hereinafter cited as ERISA]. 
3 For discussions of the impact of ER ISA on the concept of employee stock ownership 
plans, see Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism, 
55 B.U.L. REv. 195 (1975); Note, Recent Developments in Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans. 16 WASHBURN L.J. 709 (1977). 
4 The Internal Revenue Service has acknowledged at least 250 such plans. T1ME, Oct. 4, 
1976, at 80. A Congressional report estimates that between 200 to 500 such plans have been 
established. STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., BROADENING THE 
OWNERSHIP OF NEW CAPITAL: ESOPS AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES 58 (Comm. Print 1976). 
5 See notes 27 _& 28 and accompanying text infra. 
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I. DESCRIPTION OF ESOPs 
An ESOP is a stock bonus plan that qualifies as a tax-exempt, empl<?yee 
benefit trust plan by meeting the requirements of ERISA and the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC). 6 Although ESOPs are very similar to 
pension plans, they differ in two important respects. While pensions tend 
to invest in a variety of securities, the Employee Stock Ownership Trust 
(ESOT) created by the ESOP must invest "primarily" in "qualifying 
employer securities. " 7 Furthermore, the benefits from the ESOT must be 
distributed to the employees in the form of securities of the employer 
corporation rather than in cash, as with other pension plans. 8 Since 
ESOPs are deferred compensation plans, an employee's interests in 
ESOT holdings are typically distributed when he terminates his employ-
ment with the corporation. 9 
ESOPs must also comply with the general requirements of the IRC 
which are applicable to all employee benefit plans. 1° Consequently, 
ESOPS must be set up for the "exclusive benefit" of employees or their 
beneficiaries.11 In addition, ERISA requires that each plan be managed 
by a fiduciary who must act solely in the interests of the employees or 
their beneficiaries .12 
The tax consequences of ESOPs are similar to those of other deferred 
compensation employee benefit plans .13 Typically, the employer corpora-
tion is entitled to deduct from its gross income the fair market value of its 
6 The basic requirements are outlined in the definition ofan ESOP as a contribution plan: 
(A) which is a stock bonus plan which is qualified, or a stock bonus and money 
purchase plan both of which are qualified under section 40J(a), and which are 
designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities; and 
(B) which is otherwise defined in regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his 
delegate. 
ERISA § 2003(a), l.R.C. § 4975(e)(7). l.R.C. § 401(a) outlines the requirements for employee 
benefit plans to qualify for tax preferences. The Secretary of the Treasury is primarily 
responsible for regulations concerning ESOPs, although the Secretary of Labor is also 
entitled to issue regulations concerning some aspects of ESOPs. ERIS A § 407, 29 U .S.C. 
§ 1107 (1975). 
' "Qualifying employer securities" include stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, and other 
certificates of indebtedness issued by the employer: ERISA § 407(d)(5), l.R.C. § 4975(e)(8). 
Most practitioners interpret "primarily" to mean that at least 75 % of the ESOT holdings 
should be "qualifying employer securities." Bushman, ESOPs: A Trustee's Perspective, 115 
TR. & EST. 416, 417 (1976). 
8 Fractional shares may, however, be distributed in cash. Treas. Reg.§ l.401-l(a)(2)(iii), 
(b)(l)(iii), Rev. Rul. 71-256, 1971-1 C.B. 118. 
9 The employee may elect special lump sum distribution tax treatment under l.R.C. 
§ 402(e), or he may receive his distribution as an annuity under I.R.C. §§ 72, 402(a). 
10 In order to be exempted from federal taxation by I.R.C. § 501, a trust which forms a 
part of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan for employees must comply with 
certain requirements relating to employer contributions, vesting, nondiversion, coverage, 
nondiscrimination, and forfeitures. l.R.C. § 401. 
11 l.R.C. § 401(a)(2). 
12 ERISA § 404(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(J) (1975). 
13 For a fuller discussion of the tax implications of ESOPs, see Pavlock & Lieberman, The 
Taxation of ESOTs (pts. I & 2), 7 TAX ADVISER 68, 132 (1976). See also Pavlock & 
Lieberman, Employee Stock Ownership Trusts-An Update, 8 TAX ADVISER 476 (1977); 
Note, Recent D.evelopments in Employee Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 3. 
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contributions to the ESOT up to 15 percent of the compensation of 
covered employees.14 Excess contributions may be carried forward or 
back for additional tax deductions. 15 Income of the ESOT is tax-exempt 
so long as it continues to comply with the relevant IRC provisions. 16 
Moreover, employee interests in ESOTs are not taxed until they are 
actually distributed .1 7 
II. ESOPs AND VoTING RIGHTS 
A. Present Law 
Because ESOPs invest primarily in employer securities, the question of 
who should control the voting of such securities is of particular impor-
tance. Presently, the employer securities held by the ESOT need not have 
any voting rights attached to them. 18 If the securities do have voting 
rights, they are exercised by the plan fiduciary, 19 who is typically ap-
pointed by the board of directors of the employer corporation. 20 Em-
ployees are not guaranteed the right to direct the fiduciary's voting of 
such securities. 21 Thus, the only effective way that employees can gain 
control over their interests in the ESOT is through collective bargaining 
negotiations. 
In an apparent effort to further protect employee interests, the Internal 
Revenue Service proposed regulations which would have entitled each 
employee to direct the fiduciary's voting of any shares of employer 
securities with voting rights which had been allocated to his individual 
account. 22 If an ESOT borrowed money to acquire employer securities, 
14 I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A); Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 237 (1969). Contributions may be in 
the form of cash, stock, or other property. ERISA §§ 406(a)(l)(E), (2), 407(a)(I), 414(a). 29 
U.S.C. §§ I 106(a)(l)(E), (2), I 107(a)(I) I I 14(a) (1975). For a discussion of the difficulties in 
valuing contributions of employer securities to ESOTs, see Clausen, ESOP Stock Valua-
tion: A Case for Liquidity, 115 TR. & EsT. 419 (1976). 
1s I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A). 
16 A trust described in I.R.C. § 401(a) is exempted from federal taxation by I.R.C. § 
501(a). See notes 10 & 11 supra concerning the various requirements of a trust under I.R.C. 
§ 401(a). 
17 I.R.C. § 402(a)(I). See note 9, supra. 
18 See note 7, supra. ERISA § 407 (d)(5), I.R.C. § 4975(e)(8) is the sole provision 
stipulating the type of securities an ESOT must hold. 
19 1.R.C. § 4975(e)(3). 
20 Most plans provide for a fiduciary appointed by the board of directors to vote the 
securities or for an administrative committee, also appointed by the board, to direct the 
fiduciary's voting. Bushman, supra note 7, at 434; Knight, The Increasing Importance of 
ESOPs in Employee Benefit Planning. Estate Planning, and Corporate Finance, 12 GEOR-
GIA ST. B.J. 6, 43-44 (1975). Indeed, members of the board of directors may serve as 
fiduciaries or as members of the administrative committee. Questions and Answers Relating 
to Fiduciary Responsibility Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1975). 
21 ERISA is silent as to employee direction of the fiduciary's voting, though employees 
may sometimes sit on the administrative committee which directs the fiduciary. Bushman, 
supra note 7, at 434. 
22 41 Fed. Reg. 31, 833 ( 1976). The Secretary of the Treasury derives his authority to issue 
such regulations from ERISA § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7). See note 6, supra. 
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the proposed regulations would have limited the percentage of nonvoting 
securities which could be purchased.23 If the ESOT did not borrow 
money to acquire employer securities, however, the proposed regulations 
would not have required the ESOT to· hold any voting employer se-
curities. 24 Thus, although the proposed regulations would have provided 
employee control over the exercise of voting rights on employer se-
curities, they would not have guaranteed that all employer shares held by 
ESOT be vested with voting rights. 
Nevertheless, even the limited expansion of employee control pro-
posed by the Internal Revenue Service met with strong opposition from 
Congress. The Conference Report which accompanied the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976 specifically criticized the proposed regulations, and expressed 
the belief that "the usual rules applicable to employee plans properly 
protect the interests of plan participants. " 25 Subsequently, the Internal 
Revenue Service issued final regulations which withdrew the proposed 
regulations to expand employee voting rights. 26 Therefore, employees are 
still not assured of any voting control over employer securities held by 
ESOTs. 
B. The Need for Full Voting Rights 
The fundamental policy of BRISA is to protect the interests of em-
ployees in their benefit plans. 27 In keeping with this policy, employees 
should be guaranteed full voting control over all employer securities held 
by an ESOT. Specifically, each employee should be entitled to direct the 
fiduciary's voting of all employer securities held by the ESOT on his 
behalf, whether allocated to his individual account or not.28 
The proposed regulations provide "that each participant is entitled to direct a designated 
fiduciary as to the manner in which any employer security allocated to the account of such 
participant is to be voted." 
Proposed Treas. Reg.§ 54.4975-ll(d)(2)(i), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,837 (1976). They also would 
have required that voting rights "be exercised only to the extent directed by participants" 
and that "[a]mounts contributed to an ESOP by an employer ... be allocated to the account 
of each participant" by the close of the plan year. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-
l l(d)(2)(iii), (c)(l)(i), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,837, 31,836 (1976). 
23 Specifically, no more than 25 % of such securities could be nonvoting. Proposed Treas. 
Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(i)(8)(5), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,835 (1976). 
24 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11, 41 Fed. Reg. 31,836 (1976) is silent on this matter. 
25 H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 539, 541 (1976), reprinted in [1976) U.S. 
CODE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 4234, 4236. 
26 42 Fed. Reg. 44,388, 44,389 (1977). 
27 See generally the findings and declarations of policy for ERISA. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1001 (1975). A number of other writers have recognized the need for an approach which 
would guarantee employees more voting control over ESOT holdings. See generally Ber-
man, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and Implementation of Worker Manage-
ment, 1976 ASSOCIATION FOR SELF-MANAGEMENT NEWSLETTER No. 19, 2; Carlson, ESOP 
and Universal Capitalism, 31 TAX L. REV. 289 (1976); Ditkoff, The IRS Proposes New 
Regulations to Reform the Prodigal ESOP, 54 TAXES 630 (1976); Note, Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism, supra note 3. 
28 Employees should be entitled to direct the voting of unallocated securities· in proportion 
to their interests in the ESOT. Of course, this requirement should apply only to securities 
which could be voted by the fiduciary. For example, if an ESOT borrows money in order to 
purchase employer securities, it may have to pledge those securities and their voting rights 
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1. ESOPs as employee benefit plans-Although ESOPs are basically 
employee benefit plans, they are not gifts to the employees. 29 Rather, 
employer contributions to an ESOP are additional labor costs which an 
employer must pay for employee services.30 As a result, whenever em-
ployees receive an ESOP benefit, they forego other employee benefits. 
Thus, ESOPs are essentially investments, primarily in employer se-
curities, of employee compensation. 31 
ESOP investments may be more attractive to employees than compar-
able wage increases because of the deferred taxation of ESO P interests. 32 
However, they may be considerably less attractive, economically, than 
comparably funded diversified investment plans such as ordinary pen-
sions. 33 ESOPs are less attractive because they involve greater risks; that 
is, for any given rate of expected return, the expected variation in that 
rate of return is greater for an ESOP than for a diversified investment 
portfolio.34 The risks of diversified plans may be further reduced with 
investment securities which are safer than those of the employer. 35 Thus, 
an ESOP faces a higher risk of great depreciation in value than does a 
diversified plan. 36 This higher risk is a direct consequence of the require-
as collateral for the loan. The ESOT then would not have control over the voting of such 
shares and thus the requirement of passing through voting rights should not apply to such 
securities. 
29 Several commentators implicitly view contributions to an ESOT as gifts to employees. 
Consequently, they erroneously conclude that the value of corporate stock is diluted more 
by such contributions than by comparable employee benefits. See, e.g., Blum, ESOPs as 
Financing Vehicles: Dilution Aspects, 7 TAX ADVISER 452 (1976); Huene, Beware the 
ESOP: A Cautionary Tale. 7 TAX ADVISOR 722 (1976). As long as a corporation seek profits, 
however, its contributions to an ESOT will be no more gifts to employees than are wages or 
ordinary pension benefits. For such a corporation, its contribution to an ESOT will not 
dilute the value of corporate stock any more than will alternate employee benefits. 
3° Contributions of cash to an ESOT entail costs to the corporation in that present equity 
is reduced. Even where an employer contributes treasury stock to an ESOT, there will be a 
real cost to the corporation and its shareholders since future profits must be shared and 
present per share equity is reduced. 
31 See notes 6 & 7, supra, for a discussion of ESOT investments in employer securities. 
32 See note 17 and accompanying text supra. ESOP investments may also be more 
attractive to management and shareholders than other less flexible forms of employee 
compensation. For example, an ESOP may be used to create a market for stock of a 
closely-held corporation. ESOPs also may be used to obtain equity capital, to acquire 
control of independent corporations, and to increase current tax deductions. See generally 
Knight, ESOPs Offer Employee Benefits, Corporate Financing and Control, Estate Plan-
ning, 43 J. TAX. 258 (1975); Note, Employee Stock Ownership Trusts: Tax Advantages for 
Estate Planning in Close Corporations, 84 YALE L. J. 1519 (1975); and Carlson, supra note 
27, at 294-300. 
33 Pension funds are required to diversify their investments. ERISA § 404(a)(l){C), 29 
U.S.C. § ll04(a)(l){C) (1975). ESOPs are specifically exempted from this diversificatior. 
requirement. ERISA § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(2) (1975). 
34 When time is held constant, the riskiness of an investment will decrease as the number 
of holdings increases. While the marginal decrease in risk resulting from each additional 
holding becomes negligible as the number of holdings increases above five holdings, diver-
sification can reduce risk substantially up to that point. R. BREALY, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 123-32 (1969). 
35 ESOPs, on the other hand, must always invest primarily in employer securities. See 
notes 6 & 7 supra. 
36 Indeed, the value of securities in 60% to 70% of corporations actually declines over the 
life of an employee. Drucker, Pension Fund "Socialism," 42 Pue. INT. 3, IO (1976). While 
diversified investments may also depreciate in value, diversification will reduce the average 
size of such depreciation. See R. BREAL Y, supra note 34, at 123-32. 
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ment that ESOPs invest primarily in employer securities.37 Since many 
employees will have much of their savings invested through their corpora-
tion's employee benefit plan; ESOPs will usually be Jess attractive to 
them than a comparably funded diversified plan.38 
It has been argued, however, that ESOPs are more valuable to em-
ployees than diversified plans.39 According to this view, ESOT holdings 
will appreciate faster than diversified plan holdings because employees' 
beneficial interests in the corporation, wholly apart from any voting 
rights, will prompt them to work harder, increase their productivity, and 
thereby earn greater profits for the corporation.40 Little evidence c_an be 
found to support this view, however. 41 Indeed, indirect rewards are 
generally ineffective in' increasing employee productivity.42 Moreover, 
unless the ESOT holds a large percentage of the corporation's securities, 
there is no reason to expect employees to be more productive since most 
of the increased earnings would go to nonemployee shareholders. 43 
37 Drucker, supra note 36, at 10, therefore concludes that ESOPs are "financially un-
sound to the point of recklessness." · 
38 Admittedly, diversification also reduces the chance of an investment plan making great 
gains. It has been argued that employees should gamble their savings in an undiversified 
portfolio on the chance of such gains. For example, attorney Louis Kelso, the originator of 
the ESOP idea, sees diversification as "something a rich man does in order not to become 
poor. A poor man who has nothing loses nothing if it fails but can stand to reap huge rewards 
if it succeeds." Quoted in O'Hara & Crawford, Will Every Corporation Have an E.S.O.P.? 
Senator Long Makes it Hard to Say No, 61 A.B.A.J. 1366, (1975). Actually, employees face 
a greater chance of losing their retirement savings if they have an ESOP instead of a 
diversified plan. 
39 Id. at 1369; Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOPs): Hearings before the Joint 
Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), at 689 [hereinafter cited as Employee Sock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs)] (Submission of the United States Railway Ass'n). 
40 Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), supra note 39, at 689 (Submission of the 
United States Railway Ass'n). 
41 Id. at 690-91, 787-97 (Submissions of the United States Railway Ass'n). For example, a 
study of 15 corporations with established ESOPs did not find any convincing evidence that 
employees became more motivated or more productive. Id. at 793. For a rebuttal see id. at 
263-355 (Submission of attorney Louis Kelso). · 
42 See generally E. LAWLER III, MOTIVATION IN WORK ORGANIZATIONS (1973). Lawler 
suggests that economic rewards are effective in increasing employee productivity only when 
they are closely tied to individual employee performance. That is, the more indirect the 
reward, the less likely it is that an employee's individual performance will be affected. For 
example, a machine operator is likely to be far more motivated by a bonus based on the 
output from his machine than he would be by a stock option plan. The value of a stock 
option depends upon the productivity of all employees and on the ability of the company to 
succeed in the marketplace while the employee's bonus is dependent solely upon his 
individual productivity. Thus, company-wide incentive plans are unlikely to have great 
effects on employee productivity. 
43 There is evidence that a financial consideration approximating 20% of pay is necessary 
to secure some increase in employee .productivity. Therefore, a substantial percentage of 
stock would have to be transferred to employees before dividend payments would produce 
additional compensation sufficient to lead to motivational changes. Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plans (ESOPs). supra note 39, at 816 (Submission of John J. Terry, Vice President 
Financial Planning, United States Railway Ass'n). There is also some evidence that an 
important correlate of profits is the percent of a company's equity which is owned by its 
non-managerial employees. Based on a limited sample of companies, it has been found that 
the greater this percent, the greater the profits of the firm. M. CoNTE & A.TANNENBAUM, 
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REPORT TO THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION UN-
ffED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PROJECT No. 99-6-09433 at 2-3 (1977). Other 
investigators have also found superior employee productivity in corporations fully owned by 
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Furthermore, even if it is true that ESOPs stimulate higher productiv-
ity, employees still face a higher risk of depreciation of their interests than 
they would face with a diversified plan. The higher risk remains because 
corporations with ESOPs may still decline or go out of business because 
of technological change or mismanagement. Thus, even if ESOPs in-
crease employee productivity, it is questionable whether the resulting 
increased expected return compensates for the high risk inherent in such 
undiversified ESOP investments. 44 
ESOPs with sufficiently higher expected returns could be more attrac-
tive than undiversified plans. One way to boost expected return is to 
require that full voting rights be passed through to employees, since 
studies have shown that employee productivity does increase when em-
ployees are allowed a greater voice in the management of their corpora-
tions. 45 Such a requirement could make it more likely that expected 
returns would be high enough to offset the greater risks of having an 
undiversified ESOP investment. 
ESOPs which give employees full voting rights may also be attractive to 
employees because of the intrinsic, non-economic value of voting rights. 
Since surveys of employee attitudes have shown that many employees 
desire to have a greater voice in the management of their corporations,46 
voting rights in employer securities may have an inherent psychological 
value to employees. When this value is also taken into consideration, 
ESOPs which grant full voting rights may be even more attractive to 
employees than comparably funded diversified investment. 
employees. See K. BERMAN, WORKER-OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 189-90 (1967); Bernstein, Run Your Own Business, I WORKING PAPERS FOR A 
~~w SoCIETY 24, 26-28 (1974); TIME, Oct. 4, 1976, at 80. Of course, the increased produc-
tivity ma~ often be explained by other factors, such as the difference in management 
approach m employee owned corporations. See E. LAWLER Ill, supra note 42, at 120-21. 
44 The primary effect of higher productivity would be to increase the expected value or a 
corporation's securities. If the ESOT investment remains undiversified, the higher risk of 
greater depreciation will remain. A substantially higher expected return would be necessary 
to compensate for the intrinsic value of a more secure investment. Therefore, a greater 
percentage of the employer securities would have to be transferred to the ESOT to make the 
gamble worthwhile, especially if most of each employee's retirement savings are involved. 
See note 43 supra. 
45 See generally E. LAWLER Ill, supra note 42, at 182-83; P. WARR & T. WALL, WORK 
AND WELL-BEING 86-115 (1975); Brower, Experience with Seif-management and Participa-
tion in United States Industry, in ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATION AND 
SELF-MANAGEMENT 73 (G. Garson & M. Smith eds. 1976). The percentage of employee 
held voting shares required to trigger increases in productivity is not certain. It does not 
seem unreasonable, however, to suggest that this threshold level might be met by the 
presence of at least one employee representative on the board of directors. 
46 P. WARR & T. WALL, supra note 45, -at 86-115, documents studies that employees value 
increased participation in corporate decision-making. Furthermore, a recent public opinion 
survey conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., of Washington, D.C., found 
that most Americans favor giving employees greater control over their corporations. Fifty 
percent of the people surveyed thought that employee owned and controlled corporations 
would improve the economy, and 66% thought that it would "do more good than harm" to 
develop programs whereby employees could gain ownership of a majority of a company's 
stock. Small Business and Society: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small 
Business. 94the Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975) (Statement of Sheila Rollins). See also J. RIFKIN, 
OWN YouR OWN Joa: ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY FOR WORKING AMERICANS 105-77 (1977). 
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Even if employees have full voting rights, the transfer by a corporation 
of a small percentage of its securities to an ESOT will give employees 
little additional representation in corporate affairs and only a small part of 
the corporate earnings. In such cases, employees probably will not be 
more productive and will be better off with other kinds of benefits. On the 
other hand, if a corporation transfers a large percentage of its securities to 
an ESOT, employees are likely to receive a more valuable benefit since 
they will acquire some control over the corporation and the right to much 
of its earnings. Thus, at a minimum, ESOPs should be required to pass 
full voting rights through to employees. 47 Furthermore, the Congress 
should consider limiting ESOP tax preferences to those plans which 
transfer a large percentage of the corporation's securities to the ESOT. 48 
2. Protection of employee interests-The guarantee of full voting rights 
includes the requirements that all employer shares held by ESOTs have 
voting rights and that employees be entitled to direct the fiduciary's 
voting of those shares. It may be argued that employees are better off 
having a competent fiduciary vote the shares without their direction. 
Since the fiduciary is chosen and serves at the grace of the existing board 
ofdirectors, 49 however, he may represent management's interests rather 
than those of the employees.50 Although an ESOP fiduciary can be sued 
for breach of his fiduciary responsibilities, such suits may provide only 
minimal protection for employee interests. 51 
In addition, employees are capable of determining what is in their best 
interests and voting accordingly. 52 While employees may have difficulty 
making complex management decisions, they are certainly as competent 
as other shareholders to decide basic questions of corporate policy and to 
select the board of directors. 53 Employees have successfully participated 
47 See notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text supra. 
48 Congress should allow tax benefits only to those plans which will pass sufficient 
securities to the ESOT to enable employees to elect at least one member of the board of 
directors. In addition, plans should not be entitled to tax benefits unless sufficient se-
curities have vested in individual accounts within 10 years of initiating the plan to enable the 
employees to control the corporation. Finally, employee approval should be required before 
a plan can be adopted. 
49 See note 20 supra. 
50 Indeed, some plans are designed to have a "friendly" fiduciary or administrative 
committee. Knight, supra note 20, at 44. Of course, employers can more easily circumvent 
the interests of employees by transferring only nonvoting securities to the ESOT, id. at 44. 
51 Under earlier law the employees had the burden of proving that the fiduciary acted in 
bad faith, arbitrarily, or fraudulently in order to prevail in such suits. 60 AM. JuR. 20 
Pensions and Retirement Funds § 78 (1976). The standards of fiduciary conduct under 
ERISA have not yet been fully developed. But see Eaves v. Penn, 426 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. 
Okla. 1976). 
52 It may be argued that a fiduciary selected by employees or by their collective bargaining 
representatives could better represent employee interests. While such a mechanism could 
well give employees as a group greater power, employees are not a homogenous group and 
probably would not agree on all issues. If employees wish to vote their shares together 
voluntarily, they should be allowed to do so. However, requiring that employee shares be 
voted by a labor-selected fiduciary is no better than having them all voted by a 
management-selected fiduciary. In either case, the employee is being denied the right to 
direct his own investment in employer securities. There is no compelling reason to treat 
employee interests in ESOTs differently from the interests of nonemployee shareholders. 
53 Indeed, because of their work experience, they may be better informed about the 
corporation's operations than the typical shareholder. 
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in the management of corporations in other countries. 54 Moreover, partic-
ipation experiments in this country have shown that employees and 
management can cooperate in formulating corporate policies. 55 Finally, 
numerous successful corporations in this country are already full owned 
and operated by their employees. 56 Thus, there is little reason to believe 
that employees are not at least as capaole of directing the voting of 
employer securities as a fiduciary. 
Furthermore, the extension offull voting rights to employees would not 
conflict with the main purposes ofESOPs.57 Some corporations might be 
discouraged from establishing ESOPS if full voting rights are required. 
Given the undiversified nature of E.SOT investments, however, this re-
quirement is necessary to protect the employees' benefit. Nor should it be 
forgotten that ESOPs are to be set up for the "exclusive benefit" of 
employees or their beneficiaries. 58 Finally, passing through full voting 
rights should reduce the amount of conflict between management and 
employees and lead to a more democratic economy. 59 
These considerations find support in the Internal Revenue Code and at 
least one state statute, which already encourage some extension of full 
voting rights to employees. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 allows cor-
porations to take extra investment tax credits if they make contributions 
of employer securities to an employee stock ownership trust and allow 
employees to direct the voting of such securities. 60 Similarly, Minnesota 
has granted state tax deductions to encourage employee stock ownership 
plans which grant full voting rights to employees. 61 Thus, there is stat-
utory encouragement for guaranteeing full voting rights to employees. 
54 In West Germany, for example, there are employee representatives in the management 
of most large corporations. There- is no indication that such participatitn has reduced the 
profits and productivity of such corporations. See generally Woolridge, The System of 
Codetermination in Western Germany and its Proposed Reform, 5 ANGLO AM. L. REV. 19 
(1976); Comment, Codetermination in __ West Germany, 51 ORE. L. REV. 214 (1971); Ball, 
,Hard Hats in Europe's Boardrooms, FORTUNE, June, 1976, at 180. For a discussion of the 
implications of the European experiences for United States labor-management relations, see 
Murphy, Workers on the Board: Borrowing a European Idea, 27 LAB. L.J. 751 (1976). 
55 See note 45 supra. 
56 See K. BERMAN, note 43 supra; Bernstein, note 43 supra; J. RIFKIN, note 46 supra, at 
27-43; M. CONTE & A. TANNENBAUM, note 43 supra. 
57 ESOPs have been justified on the grounds that they serve important capital formation 
and estate planning functions. Knight, fiote 20 supra. Furthermore, attorney Louis Kelso 
claims that the ESOPs can be used to guide economic planning, achieve economic growth 
and stability, and promote "universal capitalism." Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOPs), supra note 39, at 139 (prepared statement of Louis Kelso). While it is questionable 
whether or not ESOPs actually serve all these functions, maximizing employee voting is not 
inconsistent with any of them. 
58 See note 11 and accompanying text supra. In the words of one writer, "[i]t may be far 
bett~r to have no ESOP at all than an employee benefit plan which benefits only the 
employer." Ditkoff, supra note 27, at 634. 
59 While there might be numerous boardroom fights between management and labor 
initially, the continued dialogue and the sharing of management functions should lead to 
greater cooperation. Furthermore, this similarity of purpose should increase as the em-
ployees receive more employer securities. See M. CoNTE & A. TANNENBAUM, supra, note 
43 at 39-65. 
60 I.R.C. § 46(a)(l). For a fuller discussion of the employee stock ownership plans created 
pursuant to the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, see Carlson, supra note 27, at 304-12. See also 
Note, Recent Developments in Employee Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 3, at 716-18. 
61 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 290 et seq. (West 1974). 
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Ill. ESOPs AND PLANT CLOSINGS 
Plant closings and relocations are often accompanied by major social 
and economic costs. Unemployment due to plant shut-downs is a critical 
problem for many local communities and their residents. 62 Costs to 
former employees include loss of income and adverse psychological con-
sequences. 63 Costs borne by federal, state, and local treasuries include 
income maintenance benefits to the newly unemployed and loss of in-
come, sales, and business tax revenues. 64 Although it is clearly in the 
public interest to reduce these costs, the Federal government has no 
comprehensive program to deal with plant shut-downs. 65 
Many plants are closed for sound economic reasons. Other plants, 
which have high profit margins or good prospects for significant long-term 
growth, are likely to be sold rather than closed.66 The decision to close or 
relocate, however, may lead to the liquidation of an intermediate 
category-economically viable plants.67 This tendency is indirectly per-
mitted and indirectly encouraged by federal, state, and local government 
actions. Many states and municipalities induce relocation by providing 
62 For example, a total of 200,000 jobs were lost in Michigan as a result of plant closures 
and relocations from 1967 through 1973. The National Employment Priorities Act: Hearing 
before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor on 
H.R. 76, 94th Cong., !st Sess. 46 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The National Employment 
Priorities Act]. Furthermore, about one-half of the shut-downs occurred in the seven-county 
Detroit region, where unemployment was already in excess of the State average. Id. at 22. 
63 The magnitude of these costs depend largely on whether and how quickly the unemp-
loyed can be reabsorbed by the local economy. This, in turn, depends upon the degree of 
local unemployment, the ability of the employer to transfer employees to other plants, and 
the skill level and age of the newly unemployed. M. AIKEN, L. FERMAN,&. H. SHEPPARD, 
ECONOMIC FAILURE, ALIENATION AND EXTREMISM 30 (1968). The psychological dangers 
include alienation, feelings of helplessness, feelings of worthlessness, depression, and 
possible suicidal tendencies. For an excellent discussion of all costs of individual plant 
closings, see SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, 86TH CONG., lsT 
SESS., Too OLD TO WORK-Too YOUNG TO RETIRE: A CASE STUDY OF A PERMANENT 
PLANT SHUTDOWN (Comm. Print 1960). 
64 For example, estimated federal and state costs of making unemployment compensation 
payments and sustaining personal income tax losses for the head of a family of four with 
income of at least $165 per week in the State of Michigan were at least $3200 for one year in 
1977. This estimate does not include other income maintenance or any tax losses. Since 
former employees of corporations which have shut down may be unemployed for many 
months, the public sector costs of plant closings can be very high. See generally M. AIKEN, 
L. FERMAN & H. SHEPPARD, supra note 63. 
65 A number of Western European countries do have programs to deal with this type of 
problem. See The National Employment Priorities Act, supra note 62, at 85-96 (Workers' 
Rights and Plant Shutdowns, statement prepared by the U.A.W.); Id. at 118-126 (Plant 
Closure and Relocation Laws in Western Europe, statement prepared by the staff of the 
Library of Cong., Law Library). 
66 While there is no way to estimate how many economically viable plants have shut 
down. a number of plants which would have closed down had their employees not purchased 
them are still in operation. The two plants of this group which have had time to establish a 
performance record seem to be operating successfully. M. CoNTE & A. TANNENBAUM, 
supra note 43, at 39-65 (South Bend Lathe Co.); J. RIFKIN, supra note 46, at 41-43 (Vermont 
Asbestos Group). 
67 An economically viable plant may be considered to be one which can meet all of its 
short-term and long-term obligations. Under this view even plants which generate only small 
profits must be considered economically viable in that they can sustain their operations over 
an indefinite period of time. 
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property tax incentives, loans, and lower pollution and occupational 
health and safety standards. 68 Moreover, the Internal Revenue Code 
permits corporations to deduct the costs of relocating as ordinary ex-
penses of doing business, and investment tax credits and accelerated 
depreciation allowances may actually encourage the closing of viable 
plants and the opening of new ones.69 In addition, federal and state labor 
laws. impose no meaningful restrictions on the right of corporations to 
relocate for economic reasons. 70 Thus, the combined actions of the pri-
vate market and various levels of government can lead to the closing of 
some economically viable plants. 
ESOPs can serve as the basis for a federal program to reduce the 
number of plant closings, since ESOPs can be used to enable employees 
to purchase their plants and keep them operating. This employee buyout 
mechanism is initiated by first having the employer corporation establish 
an ESOP. The ESOT then borrows money and purchases all outstanding 
employer securities in the plant corporation involved. 71 The loan is se-
cured by the ESOT's pledge of all those securities as collateral and by the 
plant corporation's promise to make sufficient annual contributions of 
cash to the ESOT to enable it to repay the loan. 72 As the ESOT pays off 
the loan, the lender must gradually release the pledged securities. 73 In this 
way the ESOT comes to hold and control all of the outstanding plant 
securities, and these are allocated to individual accounts. Thus, ESOPs 
can provide a mechanism for employees to purchase their plant with 
borrowed funds. Because of the tax advantages of ESOPs, the purchase 
can be accomplished at lower effective cost to the employees through an 
ESOP than through a direct purchase. 74 
68 The National Employments Priorities Act, supra note 62, at 86 (statement prepared by 
the United Automobile Workers). 
69 Id. at 86; see also I.R.C. § 162 (business expenses); I.R.C. § 38 (investment tax credit); 
I.R.C. § 167 (depreciation). 
70 See note 68 supra. 
71 If the employer corporation operates more than one plant, the plant to be divested 
should be separately incorporated as a plant corporation. 
ESOTs are specifically authorized to borrow money in order to purcha,e employer 
securities. ERISA § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § I 108(b)(3) (1975); ERISA § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975 
(d)(3). 
72 In most cases collateral for an ESOP loan may consist only of qualifying employer 
securities. ERIS A § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § I 108(b)(3) (1975). 
73 In general, the loan must provide for the proportional release from encumbrance of plan 
assets used as collateral for the loan. Treas. Reg.§ 54.4975-7(b)(8)(i), 42 Fed. Reg. 44,391 
(1977). For example, if 15,000 shares of X stock are pledged as collateral for a 15 year loan 
payable in level annual amounts, then 1/isth or 1,000 shares must be released in each 
succeeding year of the loan. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(8)(iv), 42 Fed. Reg. 44392 (1977). 
For loans of a JO to 15 year maximum duration, this requirement poses minimal interfer-
ence with the employee's takeover of the plant corporation. A gradual release of shares from 
the lender's encumbrance may even promote the gradual and orderly transfer of control of 
the plant corporation from management to employee representatives. Loans of a duration of 
more than 15 years seem to require an unreasonably long time period to transfer control and 
should be prohibited by statute or regulation. 
74 Since employer contributions to ESOTs are tax deductible (see note 14 supra), and 
taxation of employee interests is deferred until distribution, when their tax brackets will 
probably be lower (see note 17 supra), the employees can use the ESOP to purchase the 
corporation with pre-tax.dollars. In the alternative, the employees would have to purchase 
FALL 1977] ESOPs and Plant Closings 173 
Unfortunately, sufficient private sector financing for such purchases is 
not always available to ESOTs. 75 Lenders may be skeptical of the em-
ployees' ability to run a company that earlier owners are abandoning. In 
addition, employees often have no capital of their own to risk. Therefore, 
the federal government should loan funds or guarantee loans to ESOTs to 
enable employees to keep their plants open. 76 Of course, these funds or 
guarantees should only be provided to ESOTs which cannot secure pri-
vate sector financing. 77 Furthermore, government funding or guarantees 
should only be available to ESOTs in plants that can be expected to 
survive the rigors of competition and sustain a profit. 78 
By preserving jobs such a program could significantly reduce the bur-
dens placed on local economies by the closing of economically viable 
plants. If the guidelines for eligibility for government aid are carefully 
developed, the program could certainly be financially sound. Further-
more, such a program could lead to continued growth in this country's 
productive capacity and perhaps even reduce the overall unemployment 
rate of the country. Finally, such a program could contribute to greater 
worker satisfaction and productivity in those plants which become wholly 
employee-owned. 79 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Employee stock ownership plans which guarantee employees full vot-
ing control over all employer securities held by the ESOT can yield 
valuable benefits. If the ESOT holds a great enough percentage of the 
corporation's securities, the employees will be assured of substantial 
participation in corporate affairs and a large share of corporate earnings. 
These advantages can make up for the greater risks inherent in the 
the corporation out of their post-tax savings. Hence, employees can use an ESOP to defer 
taxation and thus effectively reduce cost of employer securities. 
75 For example, the employees who purchased the South Bend Lathe Co. and the 
Vermont Asbestos Group were unable to secure private financing without governmental 
guarantees. See note 66 supra. 
76 The United States Economic Development Administration (EDA) has already assisted 
the employees of one company, the South Bend Lathe Co., keep a plant open. The EDA 
provided the city of South Bend with five million dollars to be loaned to the South Bend 
Lathe Co. ESOT, thereby enabling the employees to purchase their plant and keep it in 
operation. M. CONTE & A. TANNENBAUM, supra note 43, at 39. A much larger program 
should be established to make loans directly to ESOTs. In order to reduce the outlay of· 
public funds, such a program could even integrate the administration costs into the loan 
charges repayable by the ESOTs. 
77 This condition could be satisfied by requiring that each applicant make a bona fide 
attempt to secure private financing and by requiring applicants to present letters refusing 
loans from one or more local lending institutions. 
78 Applications for assistance could be required to include supporting information in 
sufficient detail to enable the government to analyze the technical and economic feasibility 
of the proposal. In some cases the government may require a technical and economic 
feasibility study prepared by an independent consultant. 
79 See notes 43, 45 & 46 supra. 
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undiversified investments of ESOTs. Clearly, however, the Federal gov-
ernment should modify the present ESOP laws to ensure that only ESOPs 
which transfer a substantial percentage of voting corporate securities to 
the ESOT and which pass through full voting rights to employees will be 
entitled to preferential tax treatment. 
ESOPs can also serve the important function of enabling employees to 
purchase their corporations. ESOPs can be used to prevent the closing of 
economically viable plants and to preserve jobs. In order to facilitate this 
use of ESOPs, the Federal government should develop a major program 
to provide financial assistance to employees who wish to keep their plants 
operating through ESOP employee buyouts. Such a program could help 
reduce unemployment and promote local economic stability. 
-Jonathan Barry Forman 
